Are there objective values? Is moral realism true?
A great deal of the discussion over whether there are objective values or whether moral realism is true is derailed by a failure to recognize that each of these questions is ambiguous. They have two different meanings, and the answer to the question given one meaning is “yes” and when given the other meaning is “no”.
Failure to recognize this ambiguity causes people to think that the answer to both questions must be the same.
There was a time when I participated in two online debates at the same time.
Both debates were on the same topic: Are there objective moral values?
In one debate, I argued that there are no objective moral values. In the other debate I argued that there are objective moral values.
I defended exactly the same position in both debates.
I was able to do this because the question, “Are there objective moral values?” had different meanings in each debate. For one of the two meanings, the answer is “No.” For the other meaning, the answer is “Yes.”
Objective Properties
In the first debate, the question of whether there are objective moral values was the question of whether what is morally obligatory or prohibited has an intrinsic moral property that commands us to do that which is obligatory or refrain from doing that which is prohibited.
My answer is: No, there are no intrinsic moral properties. In this, I agree with J.L. Mackie.
All value requires a desire (or aversion). For anything to have value, there must be a desire that is satisfied by realizing that thing. Pain is bad because we have evolved a disposition to have an aversion to pain. This came about through a process of evolution - because an adverse or “make it not the case” reaction to certain physical sensations helped keep our ancestors alive and raising offspring. Still, the aversion to pain sends the instruction “make it the case that I am not in pain,” not “make it the case that we successfully reproduce”. Evolutionary success is not the goal. Avoiding pain is the goal and evolutionary success influences whether the next generation is disposed to adopt the same goal. We also evolved systems that modify desires based on experience, so we learn to like and dislike certain things. People with different experiences acquire different likes and dislikes.
Morality comes about because the same aversion to pain that gives me a reason not to put my hand on a hot stove gives me a reason to give other people reasons not to put my hand on a hot stove. I can give them external reasons (promises of reward or threats of punishment). In addition, because their desires can be shaped by experience, I can give them internal reasons by creating the experiences that generate those internal reasons. Praise and condemnation tend to work in many cases. For people living in a community, they have reasons to ask, “What should we be praising?” and “What should we be condemning?” In other words, “What is praiseworthy?” and “What is worthy of condemnation (blameworthy)?”
There are no intrinsic moral properties - only desire-based reasons to praise and condemn.
Objective Facts
In the second debate, the question of whether there are objective moral values was the question of whether there are moral facts that are independent of an individual’s or a culture’s attitudes towards those facts.
My answer is: Yes.
The account given above of moral values make moral claims independent of the attitude of the person who is making the claim or of the culture in which those claims are made. Take the claim: It is wrong to break a promise. People generally have reasons to create experiences that give each other internal reasons to keep promises. People do this largely by praising those who keep promises and condemning those who break promises. That people had these reasons was true before I was born, remains true throughout my lifetime, and will continue to be true after I die. We have reasons to establish and uphold a system of promise keeping even if we did not recognize that fact. In this, I agree with J.L. Mackie when he wrote, “Hobbes’s third law of nature, that men perform their covenants made, is an eternal and immutable fragment of morality.”
Note: I hold that philosophers for 50 years have failed to recognize that Mackie saw this same distinction between the two questions. While he argued, as I do, that there are no intrinsic moral properties, he also wrote: “Something may be called good simply in so far as it satisfies or is such as to satisfy a certain desire; but the objectivity of such relations of satisfaction does not constitute in our sense an objective value.” It is in this sense that Mackie says that promise keeping is an eternal and immutable fragment of morality.
In summary: The question, “Are there objective moral values?” has two meanings. Are there intrinsic moral properties? Answer: No. Is it objectively true that people generally have reasons to condemn those who, for example, break promises? Answer: Yes.
The Subjectivity of Definitions
Here, one can say, “I don’t have to accept your definition of ‘wrong’. I can accept whatever definition I like.”
The response is: Yes, you can. You can also accept whatever definition you want for the terms water, atom, planet, game, or any other term, including every term in logic, math, and science. The meanings of all words are a matter of convention. We can change the meaning of any word at will. However, once we have settled on a meaning, in most cases, we cannot choose the reference. (Exceptions include the reference of terms like illegal, is spelled, is named, and is against the rules.) Astronomers could not both adopt the proposed new meaning of planet and make the term refer to Pluto. Scientists could not have continued to use the meaning of atom that included without parts and have the term refer to the smallest bits of oxygen and the like.
One of the key things that recommends one definition of moral over alternatives is that the proposed definition has the closest fit to how people actually use moral terms. In a previous post I provided a long list of the ways in which the definition of wrong that I offer here - to say that an act type is wrong is to say that people generally have reasons to give each other reasons (external and internal) not to preform acts of that type - fits how people use moral terms. It fits everything from the types of data used to defend or refute moral claims, what counts as an excuse, the weighing of conflicting obligations, the use of condemnation as a response to wrongdoing, the concepts of negligence and supererogatory action, the acts/omissions distinction, the fact that ideally people act morally for its own sake and not for the sake of other ends. If somebody were to present an alternative theory for the meaning of wrong that comes closer to how the term is actually used, then I would be obligated to accept that theory. But I know of no such theory.
While we are talking about epistemic norms, note that a desire that P provides an instruction to deliberation to favor the action plans that make or keep ‘P’ true. It motivates the agent to select the action plan that would make or keep ‘P’ true given the agent’s beliefs. People have a reason to have what they are motivated to do be the same as what they have a reason to do, which means that people generally have reasons to adopt epistemic norms that produce true beliefs.
Moral Realism
When we switch to the question of whether moral realism is true, we face a similar dichotomy.
On one interpretation of the question, it is asking whether one is a realist when it comes to intrinsic prescriptive properties that command that people perform or avoid performing certain types of actions. On this interpretation, I am an anti-realist.
On the other interpretation, the question asks whether moral utterances are propositions that refer to something real - something that exists in the world and is independent of the sentiments, beliefs, or judgments of the person expressing the utterance. On this interpretation, I am a moral realist.
Desires are real. Almost everybody can test this by putting their hand on a hot stove. (Please don’t. Trust your intuitions on this.) It is objectively true that certain types of actions (breaking promises, drunk driving) tend to thwart desires. It is objectively true that people generally have reasons to give each other reasons not to do such things. It is objectively true that it is possible to give people both external (reward/punishment) and internal (through praise and condemnation) reasons not to do such things. When it is true that people generally have reasons to condemn those who perform certain types of action (breaking promises, drunk driving), it is objectively true.
On Realism and Objective Value Debates
The problem, as I mentioned above, is that many debates over objective moral values or moral realism fail to recognize this distinction. We find people who recognize the problems with the thesis that there are intrinsic prescriptive properties and conclude they do not exist, who then leap to the inference that moral claims must be assertions of attitudes. And we find people who recognize the problems with saying that things like rape, slavery, and genocide can be made moral just by approving of then who leap to the inference that there must be intrinsic prescriptive properties.
I recognize the problems with both: with the thesis that there are intrinsic prescriptive properties, and the thesis that rape, slavery, and genocide can be made permissible just by approving of them. There are no intrinsic prescriptive properties, but it is objectively true that people generally have reasons to condemn those who rape, exploit and abuse others (including slavery), or kill innocent people (including genocide).
And so, when I am asked if I believe that there are objective moral values or if I am a moral realist, my answer tends to be: It’s complicated.